Glaucias, the Illyrian

Episode I: King of the Taulantii/King of the Illyrians

Glaucias was, according to Arrian, king of the Taulantti, an Illyrian tribe that occupied the current region of Central Albania. On the other hand, Plutarch and Diodorus describe him as the king of the Illyrians. However, there should be no confusion between the terms “king of the Taulantii” and “king of the Illyrians”. These are just alternative and complementary ways of illustrating the same picture. It should be noted that when Glaucias is referred here as king of the Illyrians, Illyria, or Illyrian kingdom, it is done for purpose of simplicity and it only suggests that he reigned over a territory that was inhabited by Illyrian tribes including the Taulantii. It does not suggest that Glaucias ruled over all the Illyrian tribes across the Balkans. Glaucias seems to have been the son of Pleuratus I and thus, around 335, succeeded him on the throne of the Taulantii. Regarding the center of his kingdom, it was located somewhere around Tirana (in the ancient ruins of Perqop), controlling the plain of that region.

Map showing the areas and cities mentioned in the text and the realm of Glaucias in its initial form and in its greatest expansion during 335-302 B.C.E.
Map showing the ancient areas (Illyria, Epirus, Macedon, Paeonia, Agrianes, Dardania) and cities mentioned in the text and the realm of Glaucias in its initial form and in its greatest expansion during 335-302 B.C.E.

Episode II: Battle against Alexander the Great

Glaucias appears for the first time as a political and military figure in the events related to the campaign of Alexander the Great against the Illyrians in the summer of 335. At that time, Alexander was conducting a campaign in northwestern area of his inherited kingdom, when he was notified that Cleitus, son of Bardylis, had rebelled against the Macedonian rule and that Glaucias was assisting him. Another Illyrian tribe, the Autariatae, who were apparently allied with Cleitus and Glaucus, had planned to assault Alexander on his march. Alexander, anticipating the interception of the Autariatae, engaged the king of the Agrianes, Langarus, to crush them in their own lands. Langarus did so energetically thus opening the way for Alexander to lead his forces against Cleitus and Glaucus. The Macedonians marched safely through the valley of the Erigon (Crna) River to arrive near the city of Pelion that was captured by the Illyrian forces of Cleitus and that dominated the area of Dassaretis. Meanwhile, the Illyrian forces of Glaucus were on their way to join Cleitus at Pelion. Hammond rightly states that Illyrian region was already familiar to Alexander:

As a royal Page, he had accompanied Philip on Illyrian campaigns, and then in 337 he had escorted Olympia to Epirus and gone from there to Illyria, where he stayed with one or more kings, perhaps indeed with Glaucias”.

The Illyrian forces were divided into two main parts. One was positioned within Pelion while others had occupied the highest peaks around the area and above the main passes. Upon arriving near Pelion, Alexander set his camp outside the city with the aim of recapturing it by keeping the Illyrian forces divided as they were. The arrival of Glaucias and his large number of troops in the area forced Alexander in a defensive position and changed his aim of recapturing the city. The first move of the Macedonian ruler was to sent Philotas, one of his commanders, with a cavalry unit, on a nearby expedition to secure food for the army. It is Arrian that gives us the description of the following events:

When Glaucias heard of the expedition of Philotas he marched out to meet him, and seized the mountains, which surrounded the plain, from which Philotas intended to procure forage. As soon as Alexander was informed that his cavalry and beasts of burden would be in danger if night overtook them, taking the shield-bearing troops, the archers, the Agrianians, and about four hundred cavalry, he went with all speed to their aid. The rest of the army he left behind near the city, to prevent the citizens from hastening forth to form a junction with Glaucias (as they would have done), if all the Macedonian army had withdrawn. Directly Glaucias perceived that Alexander was advancing, he evacuated the mountains, and Philotas and his forces returned to the camp in safety. But Cleitus and Glaucias still imagined that they had caught Alexander in a disadvantageous position; for they were occupying the mountains, which commanded the plain by their height, with a large body of cavalry, javelin-throwers, and slingers, besides a considerable number of heavy-armed infantry. Moreover, the men who had been beleaguered in the city were expected to pursue the Macedonians closely if they made a retreat. The ground also through which Alexander had to march was evidently narrow and covered with wood on one side it was hemmed in by a river, and on the other there was a very lofty and craggy mountain so that there would not be room for the army to pass, even if only four shield-bearers marched abreast.

Then Alexander drew up his army in such a way that the depth of the phalanx was 120 men; and stationing 200 cavalry on each wing, he ordered them to preserve silence, in order to receive the word of command quickly. Accordingly he gave the signal to the heavy-armed infantry in the first place to hold their spears erect, and then to couch them at the concerted sign; at one time to incline their spears to the right, closely locked together, and at another time towards the left. He then set the phalanx itself into quick motion forward, and marched it towards the wings, now to the right, and then to the left. After thus arranging and re-arranging his army many times very rapidly, he at last formed his phalanx into a sort of wedge, and led it towards the left against the enemy, who had long been in a state of amazement at seeing both the order and the rapidity of his evolutions. Consequently they did not sustain Alexander’s attack, but quitted the first ridges of the mountain. Upon this, Alexander ordered the Macedonians to raise the battle cry and make a clatter with their spears upon their shields; and the Taulantii, being still more alarmed at the noise, led their army back to the city with all speed.

As Alexander saw only a few of the enemy still occupying a ridge, along which lay his route, he ordered his body-guards and personal companions to take their shields, mount their horses, and ride to the hill; and when they reached it, if those who had occupied the position awaited them, he said that half of them were to leap from their horses, and to fight as foot- soldiers, being mingled with the cavalry. But when the enemy ‘saw Alexander’s advance, they quitted the hill and retreated to the mountains in both directions. Then Alexander, with his companions, seized the hill, and sent for the Agrianians and archers, who numbered 2,000. He also ordered the shield-bearing guards to cross the river, and after them the regiments of Macedonian infantry, with instructions that, as soon as they had succeeded in crossing, they should draw out in rank towards the left, so that the phalanx of men crossing might appear compact at once. He himself, in the vanguard, was all the time observing from the ridge the enemy’s advance. They, seeing the force crossing the river, marched down the mountains to meet them, with the purpose of attacking Alexander’s rear in its retreat. But, as they were just drawing near, Alexander rushed forth with his own division, and the phalanx raised the battle cry, as if about to advance through the river. When the enemy saw all the Macedonians marching against them, they turned and fled. Upon this, Alexander led the Agrianians and archers at full speed towards the river, and succeeded in being himself the first man to cross it. But when he [Alexander] saw the enemy pressing upon the men in the rear, he stationed his engines of war upon the bank, and ordered the engineers to shoot from them as far forward as possilile all sorts of projectiles which are usually shot from military engines. He directed the archers, who had also entered the water, to shoot their arrows from the middle of the river. But Glaucias durst not advance within range of the missiles so that the Macedonians passed over in such safety, that not one of them lost his life in the retreat.

The Illyrians had no reason to engage in close combat with the Macedonian force that was leaving the site in such an organized manner. Glaucus and Cleitus thought the initial Macedonian departure as a victory since they have managed to keep the city of Pelion into their possession. This initial impression caused the Illyrians to encamp carelessly near the city without expecting Alexander’s return. On noticing this weakness, Alexander returned on the site three days later and caught the Illyrian forces by surprise killing many of them and capturing many others. Cleitus himself managed to escape the slaughter and burned his city. Glaucias had also left the area with the surviving forces and returned to his kingdom through the surrounding mountains. After burning the city of Pelion, Cleitus went into the territory of the Taulantii and found refugee in Glaucus’ dominion.

The defeat that Glaucias suffered at Pelion did not challenged his authority over his central possessions, which were located further west from the battlefield. On the other hand, Alexander had no intention to pursue the army of Glaucias deep in the Illyrian hinterland and risk suffering further losses in a rough and unsuitable terrain for the military formations of the Macedonians. The victory of Macedon at Pelion served mainly to secure the kingdom’s northwestern border on the verge of the main expedition against Persia.

Despite the description of classical sources, the campaign against the Illyrians proved difficult for Alexander, so much so that a news that he was killed during battle spread out in Thebes and other places under Alexander’s control. This was another important reason why, soon after the victory over Glaucias and Cleitus, Alexander had to return into Thebes where his presence was required in order to reaffirm his authority and prepare for his major campaign against Persia. As e result, Glaucias continued his reign for another generation over the Illyrians, including into his possessions the lands of other surrounding Illyrian tribes.

Little is known about the activity of Glaucias during 334-317. Some scholars suggest that Glaucias, in addition to the lands of the Taulantii he already controlled, gradually took over the region that was once ruled by Cleitus, apparently capitalizing on the fact that Alexander was engaged far away in war against the Persians.

Episode III: Becoming the adoptive father of Pyrrhus of Epirus

In 317, Cassander, the ruler of Macedon, interfered in the internal affairs of Epirus, encouraging a civil unrest there, in a continuous effort to expand his authority over this region that was after all the homeland of Olympia, mother of Alexander the Great and thus Cassander’s ultimate enemy. As a result of the civil unrest and the Macedonian pressure, Aeacides, up until then the ruler of Epirus and supporter of Olympia, was forced to resign from the throne and leave his state. Aeacides’ two-year old son and the rightful heir of Epirus, Pyrrhus II, was saved from Cassander’s persecution and brought for protection in the court of king Glaucias. It was the same child that would later be known as Pyrrhus of Epirus or Pyrrhus the Great, one of the most skilled generals of his time who challenged the forces of the Roman Republic in the southern Italian peninsula. By the time Pyrrhus was brought in the Illyrian court, Glaucias had already established a friendly relationship with the monarchy of Epirus. Thus, the Illyrian king had married Beroea, a Molossian princess, who, as Pyrrhus, was a member of the Aeacide family. Plutarch describes romantically the encounter of Glaucias with the infant Pyrrhus:

Having thus outstripped their pursuers and reached a place of safety, the fugitives [supporters of Molossian monarchy] betook themselves to Glaucias the king of the Illyrians; and finding him sitting at home with his wife, they put the little child [Pyrrhus] down on the floor before them. Then the king began to reflect. He was in fear of Cassander, who was an enemy of Aeacides [Pyrrhus father], and held his peace a long time as he took counsel with himself. Meanwhile Pyrrhus, of his own accord, crept across the floor, clutched the king’s robe, and pulled himself on to his feet at the knees of Glaucias, who was moved at first to laughter, then to pity, as he saw the child clinging to his knees and weeping like a formal suppliant. Some say, however, that the child did not supplicate Glaucias, but caught hold of an altar of the gods and stood there with his arms thrown round it, and that Glaucias thought this a sign from Heaven. Therefore he at once put Pyrrhus in the arms of his wife, bidding her rear him along with their children; and a little while after, when the child’s enemies demanded his surrender, and Cassander offered two hundred talents [about 20,000 silver coins] for him, Glaucias would not give him up…

Nicolas René Jollain, le Jeune. Infant Pyrrhus brought before Glaucus (Original: Le jeune Pyrrhus présenté à Glaucias).Musée du Louvre.
Nicolas René Jollain, le Jeune. Infant Pyrrhus brought before Glaucus (Original: Le jeune Pyrrhus présenté à Glaucias).Museum of Louvre (Musée du Louvre).

Despite the intimate description of Plutarch, Glaucias had strategical reasons to keep the infant Pyrrhus under his protection. Epirus was of geostrategic importance in order for his kingdom to be secured from the south. The way to secure this influence over Epirus was to raise Pyrrhus safely in Illyria and to establish him on the throne of Epirus at a proper age. The establishment of Pyrrhus on the throne of Epirus would reactivate the marital relations Glaucias already had established with the family of Pyrrhus. Thus, from now on, Pyrrhus would be his adoptive son.

The sitting of Pyrrhus on the throne of Epirus was realized in 309 when Glaucias, carrying Pyrrhus with him, entered into that region with a large Illyrian force. The Illyrians crushed any opposition from the pro-Macedonian group centered on king Alketas and Pyrrhus was declared the legitimate king of Epirus. After leaving appropriate guardians to assist Pyrrhus, then 12 years of age, in governance, Glaucias returned into his kingdom victorious.

The relations between Glaucus and Pyrrhus remained friendly in the coming years. In 302, Pyrrhus, would return into Illyria to attend the marriage of a son of Glaucus, with whom Pyrrhus was reared and whom Pyrrhus considered to be his brother. This event serves also to suggest that in 302 Glaucias was still alive and still ruling over his Illyrian kingdom.

Episode IV: Struggle for coastal control

Before being able to put Pyrrhus on the throne of Epirus, Glaucias had to endure the military retaliation the Macedonian king. In 314, the Macedonians led by Cassander himself, sailed from Epirus and assaulted the Illyrian coast. They conquered the main cities of Apollonia and Dyrrachium and then entered the Illyrian hinterland. During this campaign, Glaucias and his Illyrian troops were defeated, thus forcing the Illyrian king to temporarily retreat from the coastal areas. Macedonian garrisons were put in both Dyrrachium and Apollonia in order to keep their citizens under Macedonian rule and keep away potential Illyrian assaults. The Macedonian pressure forced Glaucias to sign a treaty of neutrality where he promised not to intervene in Epirus and its affairs. Although in difficult position after this Macedonian invasion, Glaucias did not surrender Pyrrhus to Cassander and continued to keep him under his protection until eventually sat him on the throne of Epirus. For now, the Illyrian king aimed at regaining possession of the coastal area and forcing the Macedonians retreat from there.

Glaucias quicly reorganized his troops and in 313 sieged the city of Apollonia. It was during this time that Acrotatus from Sparta who, up until now, had almost nothing to do with this conflict, conducted a forced naval landing in the area around the sieged city, forced here by a sea storm while on his way towards Acragas (modern Agrigento). Inside the city of Apollonia, the Macedonian garrison positioned there by Cassander, was leading the stance against the Illyrian king, thus attempting at the same time to ensure the Macedonian authority over an otherwise free colony. Acrotatus came into close contact with king Glaucias with whom he entered into peace negotiations on behalf of the citizens of Apollonia who were apparently influenced by a pro-Macedonian party. These negotiations were concluded with the Illyrian king signing e peace treaty with the city of Apollonia and releasing it from the siege. The terms of this treaty are unknown, but it can be assumed that they favored the position of Glaucias and threatened the authority of the Macedonians. Thus, a political tension between a pro-Macedonian party and an opposition may have been triggered in the city of Apollonia.

The Macedonian rule was undesired by the Hellenic colonies along the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea. Thus, in 312 the citizens in both Dyrrachium and Apollonia revolted against the Macedonian rule and expelled the Macedonians from their cities. In their liberation the state of Corcyra provided the main military assistance but it seems that Illyrians offered their support as well. After their liberation, Corcyra awarded Glaucias with the control of Dyrrachium. The following attempt of Cassander to regain these possession and especially Apollonia was useless. The forces of Apollonia along with possible Illyrian reinforces defeated the forces of Macedon in front of the city walls. The whole coastal Illyria had now been freed from the Macedonian forces.

 

Bibliography

Arriani. Alexandri Anabasis.

Diodori. Bibliotheca Historica.

Hammond, N.G.L. (1966). The Kingdoms in Illyria circa 400-167 B.C. The Annual British School at Athens, 61, 240-253.

Hammond, N.G.L. & Wallbank, W. (1972). A History of Macedonia 336-167 B.C. pp.39-47.

Plutarchi. Vitae Parallelae. Pyrrhus.

Velija, Q. (2012) Mbretëri dhe Mbretër Ilirë. West Print, Tiranë.

Demetrius of Pharos

Episode I: Disputed Origin

Demetrius of Pharos was a political leader who ruled among the Illyrians during the late III century B.C.E. The sources available do not allow for determining Demetrius’ year of birth. As his name suggests, he was apparently born and/or raised in the island of Pharos (Hvar, Croatia), at the time a Hellenic colony. Demetrius is mostly known for leading Illyrians against the Roman conquerors in the Second Illyrian War (219 B.C.E.). Regarding his origin, it is unclear whether Demetrius was of a Hellenic or Illyrian descent, or both. The scarce literal evidence suggests that Demetrius knew both the ancient Greek and Illyrian language. Judging from his actions, it is possible that Demetrius himself did not particularly care about his origin. Rather, he used connections he must have had on both the Hellenic and the Illyrian side and the ones he was to create with the Romans and the Macedonians, to rise in power and increase his individual political authority.

Episode II: Demetrius’ role during the First Illyrian War (229-228 B.C.E.)

 According to classical sources, Demetrius first appearance is recorded in the events related to the First Illyrian War (229-228 B.C.E.) Prior to that war, the limited information available suggests that Demetrius was the ruler of Pharos and continued to be in control of the island during and after the war. According to Appian, Demetrius ruled over Pharos as a governor on behalf of the Illyrian king, Agron (r. 250-231 B.C.E.). This means that Demetrius had already achieved an important political position among the Illyrians possibly that of an Illyrian dynast. When the Illyrians conquered Corcyra (Corfu) in 229 B.C.E., Demetrius of Pharos was left to control that island by being in charge of an Illyrian garrison stationed there while the main Illyrian navy sailed north. The island of Corcyra was strategically important since it controlled the sailing routes that linked the Italian peninsula with the Balkan Peninsula through the Straits of Hydruntum (Otranto) and the commercial sea routes that linked the Adriatic Sea coast with the Ionian Sea coast. Demetrius, apparently aware of the strategic importance of Corcyra, used his delegated status as the island’s commander to gain individual credits and emerge as an autonomous leader in the region. Thus, he distanced himself from the Illyrian queen Teuta and entered into private discussion with the Romans promising them the surrender of the island to the Roman Republic without resistance. In exchange, Demetrius seems to have been promised by the Romans a ruling position over the Illyrian coast once the planned campaign against the Illyrians would successfully be concluded.

Episode III: Joining the winning side

The Hellenic citizens of Corcyra apparently supported the offer made to the Romans by Demetrius and may have assisted him in his negotiations. These inhabitants preferred Republic’s lenient policy on Hellenic commerce instead of the absolutist regime of the Illyrian queen. Delegations were sent in Rome by Demetrius to express these views. Taking all the above factors into considerations, it is no surprise that the Romans initiated in 229 the campaign that is known as the First Illyrian War by first advancing towards Corcyra. A fleet of 200 Roman ships under the command of the Roman consul Gn. Fulvius Centumalus arrived in Corcyra where they took the possession of the colony as promised. The Illyrian garrison stationed in the island was forced by the Hellenic citizens and Demetrius to surrender itself to the Romans. This action completed the treachery of Demetrius at the expense of the Illyrian queen of the Ardiaei. Upon surrendering the city, Demetrius himself joined the ranks of the Romans where he was welcomed as an individual who knew a great deal about the Illyrian monarchy. Thus, he followed the Roman forces in their advance towards the important city of Apollonia (Pojan near Fier), another Hellenic colony that represented the Republic’s next mission. The other Roman consul Lucius Postimus Albinus on the head of 20,000 infantrymen and 200 horsemen joined Fulvius and Demetrius in Apollonia. The city welcomed the Romans and accepted their protection and friendship. The rest of the Illyrian kingdom fell under the Roman arms. In the spring of 228 the Illyrian queen was forced to sign a peace treaty that limited her possessions and naval actions and paid to the Romans a war indemnity. Demetrius, who enjoyed the support of the Romans, became the ruler of the territories that the Romans won over during the First Illyrian War apart from Corcyra and Apollonia and that consisted mainly of the coastal region along the Adriatic and northern Ionian Sea.

Episode IV: Internal and foreign issues

After the First Illyrian War, it is unclear what happened to Teuta. Sources do not mention her again. Thus, scholars suggest that Demetrius succeeded her on the Illyrian throne, sometime during 228-226 B.C.E. possibly gaining control even over the inland territories of the Ardiaei. It seems that the territories under Demetrius’ possessions were centered in the area between Scodra (Shkodër) and Lissus (Lezhë). Also, during this time, Demetrius married Triteuta, the widow of king Agron and the mother of the infant Illyrian heir Pinnes, securing in this way a stronger legitimacy over the Illyrian kingdom of the Ardiaei. Although Demetrius used this marital relation to establish his authority among the Illyrians, it appears that he never enjoyed a large and uncontested support among his subjects. Apparently, he had to share part of the authority with the previous Illyrian commander of Teuta and possibly an Illyrian dynast, Scerdilaidas. Thus the ruling period of Demetrius is characterized by this duality between him and Scerdilaidas. This situation reflects the difficulty of ruling over the Illyrians who were a population group that consisted of many tribes and where internal rivalry was often intense.

Regarding his relationship with Rome, Demetrius of Pharos was at first cautious not to provoke Rome or other Hellenic states. However, after some time, Demetrius may have noticed the almost complete lack of interest on the Roman part for the Illyrian region. This Roman absence encouraged Demetrius towards his own political and military aims in the region. Furthermore, as Polybius suggests, Demetrius may have perceived the Gallic/Celtic invasion of Italy (225) as a sign of Roman crisis. As a result, Demetrius may have concluded that his friendship with Rome was insufficient for his private ambitions and expansionist projects in the region and thus started to act autonomously and directed himself towards other foreign powers.

Map showing the approximate possessions of Demetrius during 228-220 B.C.E. and his expansion during 225-220 B.C.E.
Map showing the approximate possessions of Demetrius during 228-220 B.C.E. and his expansion during 225-220 B.C.E.

Episode V: Illyrian expeditions

While the Romans were fighting on the Gallic/Celtic frontier (225-222), Demetrius expanded his possessions and areas of influence in the Illyrian region. These areas consisted of Atintania, presumably located east of Apollonia, and Dassaretis, located further southeast. Thus Demetrius encouraged the Atintani, an Illyrian tribe, to distance from Rome and join his protection. Dassaretis, a strategic region for Illyrian-Macedonian communication, also gradually fell under Demetrius control. Regarding Demetrius’ expansionist activities, Appian goes further when he states that Demetrius in collaboration with the Istri, the natives of Istria, engaged in naval raids along the Adriatic. These raids apparently targeted Roman grain ships that must have sailed north in order to supply the main Roman army that was fighting in the Cisalpine Gaul.

Sometime during 225-223, Demetrius established an alliance with the Macedonian regent ruler Antigonus III Doson (r. 229-221). With this alliance, Demetrius may have wanted to expand his influence over southern Illyria all the way into mainland Hellas. The alliance with the Macedonian king had apparently allowed Demetrius an unobstructed advance and control over the strategic Illyrian region of Dassaretis (current southeast Albania). On his part, the Macedonian ruler had similar expansionist goals, which explain his alliance with Demetrius. He aimed at reestablishing the Macedonian control over Hellas and reviving the strength of the Macedonian state. Thus, in 223 a contingent of 1,600 Illyrian soldiers headed by Demetrius joined the mixed Macedonian force of Antigonus in his campaign against the Spartan king Cleomenes III in Peloponnesus. A year later, Demetrius and his forces played a crucial role in helping the Macedonians defeat the Spartan king at the battle of Sellasia in Laconia. This victory allowed the Macedonians to take possession of Sparta. On the other hand, Demetrius secured the control of Dassaretis and potentially, other territories across southern Illyria or other near Paeonia.

During 221, the Roman Republic carried out a short campaign against the Istri who had previously raided the Roman grain ships allegedly with the support of Demetrius. However, Demetrius is left unharmed from this campaign making Appian’s statement on Demetrius collaboration with the Istrians highly doubtful. During the same time, the Macedonian king Antigonus, after completing the aforementioned victory over Sparta, was killed in battle against the Illyrians led by Scerdilaidas in the northwestern border of Macedon. These anti-Macedonian actions reflected once again the deep divisions that were present between the Illyrians led by Scerdilaidas and the ones led by Demetrius of Pharos. Having lost Antigonus as an ally, Demetrius tried to keep the same friendly relationship with the successor of Antigonus, Philip V. The new and young ruler of Macedon had inherited his fathers’ appreciation for Demetrius but could not support Demetrius with Macedonian forces on the upcoming war that Demetrius was to have against the Romans.

In the beginning of 220, the Illyrian forces on board of 90 naval vessels (called lembus) led by Demetrius and Scerdilaidas sailed south of Lissus. This action is considered by Polybius to be in violation of the Roman-Illyrian settlement of 228 that, in essence, limited the Illyrian sail south of the Lissus line. At first, these Illyrians disembarked at Pylos (otherwise known as Navarino), a town southwest of Peloponnesus. They sieged and assaulted the city but were unable to conquer it. Just when they left the site through sea, the Illyrian fleet was divided in two. Scerdilaidas decided not to follow Demetrius and apparently returned north. On the other hand, Demetrius continued his voyage around Peloponnesus with 50 remaining ships and arrived into the Cyclades where he raided many places. After carrying out profitable raids across the Cyclades, Demetrius sailed back to Cenchreae (Kechries) on the Saronic Gulf, where Taurion, a commander of the Achaeans, approached him. Polybius writes the following:

“…[Taurion] begged him [Demetrius of Pharos] to assist the Achaeans, and after conveying his boats across the Isthmus, to fall upon the Aetolians during their crossing. Demetrius, whose return from his expedition to the islands had been much to his advantage indeed, but somewhat ignominious, as the Rhodians were sailing to attack him, lent a ready ear to Taurion, who had engaged to meet the expense of transporting the boats. But having traversed the Isthmus and missed the crossing of the Aetolians by two days, he returned again to Corinth, after raiding some places on the Aetolian coast.

Demetrius expedition against Pylos, Cyclades, and Aetolian coast in 220 B.C.E. The course of the naval route followed by Demetrius and Scerdilaidas and then by Demetrius only is fictional. The image serves only for putting Demetrius expedition into a geographical perspective.
Demetrius’ expedition against Pylos, Cyclades, and Aetolian coast in 220 B.C.E. The course of the naval route followed by Demetrius and Scerdilaidas and then by Demetrius alone is fictional. The image here serves only for putting Demetrius’ expedition into a geographical perspective.

The pass of Demetrius’ fleet across the Isthmus, made the voyage of the Illyrians back home way shorter and much safer. By apparently making use of the diolkos, the Illyrian ships were immediately transported on the waters of the Ionian Sea without having to sail around Peloponnesus again. This transportation arrangement must have also helped Demetrius escape the revenge of the Rhodians mentioned above.

Diolkos
Graphic representation of carrying ships using Diolkos. In the absence of a water canal that passed through the Isthmus, a man-made road transportation system for ships called diolkos was used in the ancient times to transport ships from the Aegean Sea into the Ionian Sea and vice-versa. In the same manner, the ships of Demetrius of Pharos were transported from the Saronic Gulf into the Ionian Sea around 220 B.C.E.

Episode VI: Fighting the Romans

Classical sources record other activities of Demetrius against the interests of the Roman Republic in the Illyrian region carried out also in 220, this time on land. Thus, Demetrius allegedly marched through Atintania, an Illyrian region he already controlled and arrived in Dassaretis. From here he assaulted the lands of the Parthini, an Illyrian tribe under Roman protection, and of Apollonia. The aforementioned activities of Demetrius were part of the Romans’ accusation towards him and formed Rome’s casus belli. The Romans called for Demetrius to appear before the Senate to confront their accusations but Demetrius never complied apparently being aware that this would not change Rome’s decision towards him. Thus, the Roman Senate decided to go into another war against the Illyrians, a campaign that was carried out in 219 and that is known as the Second Illyrian War. The Roman Republic sent into Illyria the two consuls of that year, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Marcus Livius Salinator, giving to the campaign the highest priority. The military force under their command must have been similar in size and strength to the military force used in the First Illyrian War.

The Roman campaign against Illyria did not catch Demetrius unprepared. Apparently, he had learned from the First Illyrian War and must have built his informative system along the shore. Thus, when learning of the Roman approach, the Illyrian leader initiated a defensive tactic that was concentrated around two cities: Dimale/Dimallum (Krotinë) and Pharos. These settlements may have represented the two extremes of his ruling area, the southern and northern borders respectively. According to Polybius, Demetrius “sent a considerable garrison to Dimale/[Dimallum] with the supplies requisite for such a force. In the other cities he made away with those who opposed his policy and placed the government in the hands of his friends while he himself, selecting six thousand of his bravest troops, quartered them at Pharos.

Upon arrival in Illyria, the Romans decided to assault Dimale with all their force, realizing that its fall would discourage the Illyrians fighting for Demetrius. Their strategy proved right and Dimale fell in Roman hands within a week. Local tribes and leaders approached the Romans offering to them their servitude. After establishing appropriate treaties with the locals, the Romans sailed north all the way into Pharos where Demetrius was sheltered. Through a well-conducted stratagem, the Romans took the city but were unable to capture Demetrius who, after realizing he had lost the cause, boarded a ship that awaited him on a hidden spot and sailed away. “At Actium, he [Demetrius] joined Philip of Macedon, who had inherited Antigonus’ friendship with him and had himself visited Scerdilaidas in the winter of 220-219”. From now on, Demetrius would stay as a refuge in the Macedonian territory under the protection of Philip V. Meanwhile, the Roman forces razed the entire city of Pharos to the ground and from there took possession of the remaining part of the Illyrian coast where they established or renewed the adequate agreements with the main native tribes and cities.

Episode VII: Advisor of Macedon

In 217, the Romans sent delegated into Macedon and demanded that Demetrius of Pharos be surrendered to them. King Philip obviously refused such a bold request that did not treat Macedon as an independent entity. Furthermore, Demetrius had become one of the closest advisors of the Macedonian king, eager to offer his knowledge on Romans to Philip. In June of the same year, while king Philip and Demetrius were attending the Nemean festival at Argos, the Macedonian king was informed about the loss of Rome against Carthage at the battle of Thrasymene. Initially Philip showed the letter informing on the victory of Hannibal only to Demetrius considering him the most trusted friend. Upon hearing the news, Demetrius urged the Macedonian king to hastily conclude a peace with the Aetolians and direct all his forces towards Illyria. By possessing the Illyrian coast and its ports, the Macedonians could join easily with the forces of Carthage against the Roman Republic. Polybius cites these words as being told by Demetrius to Philip:

For Greece is already entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine affection; the Aetolians from the with terror which their disasters in the present war have inspired them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the Romans have suffered a reverse.

According to Polybius “Demetrius did not do this out of consideration for Philip, whose cause was…only of third-rate importance to him in this matter, but actuated rather by his hostility to Rome and most of all for the sake of himself and his own prospects, as he was convinced that this was the only way by which he could recover his principality of Pharos.

Philip decided to follow the advice of Demetrius and in the following years tried to capture the Illyrian coast. Also, an alliance between Macedon and Carthage was established in 215 against Rome where the name of Demetrius appears in one of its clauses as follows: “the Romans shall no longer be masters of Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnus, Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, or Atintania, and they [the Romans] shall return to Demetrius of Pharos all his friends who are in the dominion of Rome”. As it is known, this scenario was not realized and Demetrius never returned as a ruler in Illyria. Polybius offers a useful insight on Demetrius and his latest deed:

“He [Demetrius] was a man of a bold and venturesome spirit, but with an entire lack of reasoning power and judgment, defects which brought him to an end of a piece with the rest of his life. For having, with the approval of Philip, made a foolhardy and ill-managed attempt to seize Messene [in 214], he perished in the action…”

 

Bibliography

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Dell, H.J. (1970). Demetrius of Pharus and the Istrian War. Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Gershichte, 19, 30-38.

Hammond, N.G.L. (1968). Illyris, Rome and Macedon in 229-205 B.C. The Journal of Roman Studies, 58, 1-21.

Hammond, N.G.L. (1966). The Kingdoms in Illyria circa 400-167 B.C. The Annual British School at Athens, 61, 240-253.

McPherson, C.A. (2012). The First Illyrian War: A Study in Roman Imperialism.

Polybii. Historiae.

Velija, Q. (2012) Mbretëri dhe Mbretër Ilirë. West Print, Tiranë.